In this paper we merge a well-cited survey of firm management practices into confidential U.S. Census microdata to examine whether generic, i.e. non-energy specific, firm management practices, "spillover" to enhance energy efficiency in the United States. We find the relationship in U.S. plants to be more nuanced than past research on UK plants has suggested. Most management techniques have beneficial spillovers to energy efficiency, but an emphasis on generic targets, conditional on other management practices, results in spillovers that increase energy intensity. Our specification controls for industry specific effects at a detailed 6-digit NAICS level and shows that this result is stronger for firms in energy intensive industries. We interpret the empirical result that generic management practices do not necessarily spillover to improved energy performance as evidence of an "energy management gap." i
Introduction
The notion that a "well-managed" company does all things equally well, begs the question of whether management practices need to be targeted to specific results/goals or will simply "spill over" into good performance in all aspects of the firm. This paper explores this issue by looking for evidence of an "energy management gap" in otherwise well managed companies. If there are no positive spillovers, i.e. no improvements in energy performance resulting from good management, then we interpret this as evidence of this different type of "energy gap." In particular, we examine whether "generic" management practices, i.e. those that are not specifically targeted to energy, which have been measured in a carefully constructed survey, result in improved energy performance. We use non-public plant level data to conduct the study, controlling for differences in plant energy use at a detailed, 6-digit NAICS industry level and also for differences in industry average energy intensity. The former is done to avoid mistaking differences in the energy requirements to produce various products as differences in "energy efficiency." The latter is done to see if the scale of the "energy spend" is more likely to put energy on the radar of management. We find beneficial spillovers for some types of management practices, but not all. Energy use by firms in energy intensive industries responds more to management practices. However, some management practices actually increase relative energy intensity instead of lowering it. We interpret this result as evidence of an "energy management gap." Energy economists have devoted substantial resources to understanding both the extent of and the reasons for the so called "Energy Efficiency Gap." 1 That this topic is of great interest should come as no surprise given that improvements in energy efficiency could potentially result not only in increased levels of firm profits but also in decreased levels of the harmful pollutants associated with burning fossil fuels. One traditional explanation for why firms vary in their energy efficiency is that unobserved differences in management quality lead some firms to adopt more efficient production techniques and to improve the monitoring of their inputs. Well run firms will be quick to spot wasteful energy use and poorly run firms may be more likely to suffer from incomplete information and principal-agent problems. While economists have puzzled over the empirical observations and developed new approaches to measure efficiency, business schools and consultancies have long recognized that lean production techniques, setting targets and providing incentives to workers can lead to increased productivity and more efficient use of inputs generally, and energy specifically, e.g. McKinsey (2009) .
The environmental policy implication of lower energy use has led to the development of voluntary government programs for energy efficiency, particularly in the absence of or supplement to other types of climate policy. These programs arose in the early 1990's (Storey, et al. 1997 ) and expanded in the US with the introduction of EPA Energy Star for Industry (Boyd et al. 2008 ) and various DOE programs like Climate Leaders, Save Energy Now, and Superior Energy Performance (SEP).
These programs may require company or industry level commitments to specific energy reduction targets, or "energy management" generally. For financial assistance and incentives, exemption from regulation and taxes, in addition to government and public recognition (Price, L., E. Worrell, et al. (2003) . While researchers have directly examined the impacts of these programs, the difficulties in quantifying a firm's management practices have prevented them from studying the exact mechanisms that lead to improved energy use. 5 In recent years a small but growing economics literature has emerged which seeks to overcome the dearth of quantifiable measures of firm management practices (Bloom and Van Reenen 2007; Martin et al. 2012) . Innovative survey techniques have been used to elicit reliable answers from plant managers on whether they have adopted effective monitoring, operations, targets and incentives practices. These data have been matched to firm level production data to examine total factor productivity for firms around the world (Bloom and Van Reenen 2007; Bloom et al. 2012; Lazear and Oyer 2012; Martin et al. 2012) . More recently, two papers have examined the relationship between management practices and energy efficiency for a subset of firms in the UK (Bloom et al. 2010; Martin et al. 2012 Previous research on UK firms has shown an unambiguous positive relationship between management practices and energy efficiency. Using data on U.S. manufacturing establishments we find this relationship to be more complex. Not all forms of "good" management practices are associated with improvements in energy efficiency. Effective monitoring, incentive structures and lean manufacturing operations are shown to be related with a reduction in energy use while the implementation of generic management targets (conditional on other practices) are found to increase energy consumption. Furthermore, the relationship between management practices and energy efficiency is more prominent within energy intensive industries, i.e. those that require high levels of energy in their production process. Management practices are shown to have lower association with energy efficiency in industries for which energy is a small component of their overall costs.
As with the rest of the literature on the topic, the observed relationships between management practices and the outcome variables of interest do not necessarily imply causality. The empirical analysis attempts to control for other factors that may be driving differences in energy efficiency, but there remains the possibility that omitted variables could be correlated with both management practices and energy use. Perhaps firms that are more willing to hire management consultants are also more likely to adapt energy saving techniques for reasons unrelated to their management practices 7 . However, there are a variety of mechanisms through which management practices may strongly impact in energy efficiency. First, effective communication between production workers and plant managers may lead upper management to more quickly be aware of wasted resources at the floor level.
Workers whose pay is tied with production efficiency may be more likely to notice and address these issues and overcome potential principal-agent problems within the firm. The implementation of "lean" manufacturing techniques will also reduce energy waste. These techniques allow for the computerized monitoring of every step in the production process and are meant to closely track use of resources. These techniques also permit the effective 6 monitoring of capital and inputs thus providing plant managers the information they need to identify and address bottle necks and inefficiencies in production.
We believe that this paper makes a number of important contributions to the emerging literature on firm characteristics and energy efficiency. As the first paper to link a large scale survey of firm management practices to the confidential plant level data found in the Census of Manufactures, we are able to explore previously unexamined relationships between management and energy use. Contrary to previous research we discover that not all management practices are associated with energy efficiency. High management scores for the operations, monitoring and incentives categories have a beneficial impact on energy use, while an emphasis on targets, conditional on other management components, tend to make firms less energy efficient. We also show that management practices are more predictive of energy efficiency within industries where energy is a higher portion of production costs.
Within these energy intensive industries management practices appear to be a sizable source of energy savings. For firms in energy intensive industries, improving their operations, monitoring and incentives management score from the 25 th to 75 th percentile is associated with a reduction in energy consumption of around 15%. 8 Given that the manufacturing sector consumes 25% of all energy in the United States, this represents significant potential energy savings.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section I describes the BVR management data as well as the non-public CM data. Section II gives the methodology and the results. Section III provides a discussion of the findings and section IV concludes.
I. Data
The The interviewer scored each of the 18 management practices on a scale from 1 to 5 with 5
indicating the best possible management in that category. A number of checks were put in place to ensure consistent scoring by the interviewers. First, a common scoring guide was given to the interviewers to provide examples of typical answers and how each one should. A number of interviews were conducted with multiple people listening and independently scoring the answers of the plant managers. Firms with multiple establishments were frequently the subject of multiple interviews to ensure that management scores were correlated across a firm's different plants. Bloom and Van Reenen (2007) show that the scores are robust to these and other consistency checks. Furthermore, because interviewers surveyed on average 50 firms, the regressions can use interviewer fixed effects to control for any systemic differences between the interviewers.
Additional data was collected on the day of the week the interview took place, the length of the interview, the gender of the plant manager and the plant manager's tenure at the firm. These interview variables are defined as noise controls in the regressions and are included to control for any bias associated with the scoring process itself. Table 1 . See the data appendix for more information on the matching and data cleaning process.
II. Methodology and Results
To analyze the relationship between management practices and energy use, we develop a two step procedure which first creates a straightforward measure of the energy efficiency for each plant in the CM and then regresses that measure on management practice variables for those plants matched from the BVR data. Our approach differs from previous methods in three fundamental ways; greater use of industry detail, controls for intermediate inputs, and use of relative energy intensity of industries. We also present results obtained using the Bloom et al.
(2010) methodology.
The first important feature of the model is its use of detailed industry information.
Different industries require widely varying amounts of energy depending on the product they are producing. The three digit industry code fixed effects used in previous research account for some of these differences but even within three digit industries there is a wide variety of products that are produced and a wide variety of ways methods which can be used to produce them. The Bloom et al. (2010) specification creates an energy efficiency measure based only on data for those establishments whose parent firms are found in the management survey. A significantly more industry specific measure of energy efficiency would take advantage of the entirety of the data available to us through the CM and would compare the plants not only to those in the management survey but to every manufacturing establishment in the entire United States. For example, at the three digit level a low energy intensity pharmaceutical manufacturer would be lumped together with a very energy intensive manufacturer of ethylene. Using the data on all plants will allow for the use of 6-digit NAICS industry controls and will significantly improve the specificity of the energy efficiency measure.
A second important aspect of the specification is its ability to control for the amount of A final feature of the model allows for management practices to have heterogeneous impacts on energy efficiency based on the type of product being produced. The model specification allows for a test of whether the effects of management practices will be most likely to spillover into energy efficiency if energy is a significant portion of the firm's input costs. Past research has made no attempt to differentiate management's impact by industry. 12 If management practices are driving energy efficiency then the relationship may be more evident in industries for which energy is a significant cost. Creating a specification which demonstrates differential impacts by industry would bolster the results.
We develop a two-step procedure which first creates a straightforward measure of energy efficiency based on data from the entire CM, and then regress that measure on management practices and the survey control variables. Consider the following first stage specification which is run separately for each of the 450 6-digit NAICS manufacturing industries:
(1)
Here, is the logged energy expenditure of establishment i and is that establishment's logged value added (gross outputnon-energy intermediate inputs). In this specification the residual, , represents the percent difference from the mean conditional on the establishment's value added. By defining as the establishment's relative energy intensity we obtain a measure of each establishment's relative energy performance which addresses the first two concerns above. 13 In this specification, establishments are compared to others in their narrowly defined industry ensuring that a low energy cosmetics manufacturer is no longer lumped together with a very energy intensive manufacturer of ethylene. Second, energy intensity is allowed to vary by the amount of value added within the more narrowly defined industry. Establishments that purchase more preprocessed inputs will have lower value added compared to those that purchase raw materials and produced the intermediate goods internally. This should be reflected in their energy intensity measure, for example a plastics plant that purchases ethylene would have lower energy use than one that produces the ethylene internally.
The second step of the procedure, shown below in equation 2 defines (the residual from equation (1) as and regresses this energy intensity variable on the management score M, and other firm and survey controls, represented by X, that are found only in the matched sub-sample of the CM with the management data.
(2)
The results from equation (2) are found in Table 2 . As with the original specification, a negative coefficient on the management score would imply that good management practices are associated with energy efficiency. Contrary to Bloom et al, the average management score is shown to have no clear relationship with a firm's energy efficiency. The coefficients point in the expected direction but lack statistical significance. Table 3 separates out the targets component from the operations, monitoring and incentives components to determine whether specific aspects of good management have differential impacts on energy. However, the two-step procedure does not immediately reveal any relationship between practices and energy inefficiency. Column 3, which shows the most detailed specification, continues to find a negative but statistically insignificant relationship between energy use and the components of management.
These results, while of interest, continue to make no distinction between industries which require little energy in their production process and those whose production process requires a significant quantity. As seen in Figure 1 , the share of energy costs is quite low for the large majority of industries. One hypothesis is that management practices are more likely to translate into lower energy use in those industries where energy is a higher portion of their costs. To examine this, we interact the management variable (and its components) with the energy intensity of the entire 6-digit NAICS industry to which the plant belongs. Consider equation (3) below (3) The specification follows equation 2 but includes an industry energy intensity variable, , as well as the interaction of this variable with the management score. 14 is defined as the energy expenditure of all establishments in the industry divided by the overall output of that industry. 15
The coefficient provides a measure of whether management impacts energy efficiency 14 Other specifications not reported here have interacted the management variable with an indicator variable equal to one if the establishment is in an industry with an energy intensity measure greater than .05. Given disclosure requirements, we only release one sample of establishments. Regressions run on subsamples (for example, only on plants in energy intensive industries) present a disclosure risk to Census. 15 . 14 more for firms in high energy industries. Panel 1 of Table 4 presents the results for Equation 3 and shows the coefficient to be negative and marginally significant. Using the coefficient of -.385 found in Column 3 of Panel 1 this implies that, for a firm in a high energy industry (with =.05) an increase in the management score from the 25 th to the 75 th percentile would result in a reduction in energy expenditure of 1.5 percent. 16 Panel 2 again separates the people and operations components from targets in the management score and interacts each with the industry energy intensity variable. This is analogous to separating the management score as done in Table 2 . The results, found in Panel 2
of Table 4 show that most forms of good management lead to significant improvements in energy efficiency for firms in high energy industries. However, the targets component is shown to have the opposite effect. Conditional on other management practices, when a firm implements strong targets we find this to have a negative impact on energy efficiency, particularly within industries for which energy is a substantial portion of their overall costs. As the coefficients show in As a comparison to our approach, we run the following econometric specification proposed by Bloom et al. (2010) Where EE is the total energy expended for establishment i, GO is the gross output and go, l, and k are the logged values of gross output, number of workers and value of capital respectively.
Gross output, labor and capital are included to account for potential economies of scale in energy use as well as input mixture. The key coefficient of interest is , which represents the relationship between the management score and energy expended per dollar of gross output. The vector Z is a broad set of controls which includes a full set of 3-digit NAICS fixed effects, various firm characteristics such as firm age and ownership structure, as well as the survey noise controls, such as interviewer fixed effects, that were described in the data section.
The findings for this specification are reported in Table 5 . Given the definition of the energy intensity variable, a negative management coefficient would imply that an increase in management quality leads to a decrease in energy use. Column 1 is the most basic specification and simply regresses energy intensity on the management coefficient and a full set of 3-digit industry code fixed effects. Column 2 additionally controls for firm age, which, among other things, may partially control for the vintage of the capital stock. Column 3 adds in region and survey noise controls as well as gross output in order to control for energy economies of scale.
Column 4 additionally includes the logged value of capital and labor as additional controls for scale as well as input mixture.
16
The results found in Table 5 represent a departure from Bloom et al. (2010) , but are consistent with our results. Columns 1-3 show a coefficient on the management variable very close to zero. The coefficient in column 4 is negative and closer to the results found for UK plants but is not statistically significant. At best, these findings show a modest relationship between energy efficiency and management, but very little can be determined given the size of the standard errors. These findings are in contrast with the UK results which show a robust significant relationship between management and energy efficiency for all of these specifications and a similar sample size.
As done above, we split the management score into its four major components (Operations, Monitoring, Incentives and Targets) as originally defined in Bloom (2007) .
Columns 5-8 of Seeking to examine this relationship further, Table 6 presents identical regressions as found in columns 1-4 of Table 5 but separates out the targets component from the overall management score and includes both these variables in the regression. Controlling for targets, the remaining management score component is shown to strongly predict energy efficiency and the results are quite similar to the findings found in previous research on UK plants (Bloom et al. 2010 , Martin et al. 2012 . The coefficient on targets is positive, implying energy inefficiency and is statistically significant in two of the specifications, but not the most detailed.
Of course, these findings do not necessarily imply a causal relationship between management and energy efficiency, but do suggest the nature of possible spillover effects. It is possible for example that firms who are likely to hire management consultants may also be more likely to adopt energy saving technology. Given the nature of the data, the causality concern requires resources beyond our current grasp and that we cannot directly address, rather we argue that the various correlations (or lack thereof) between management practices and energy use for U.S. plants is an interesting finding on its own that is suggestive of positive spillovers in some cases and an "energy management gap," particularly regarding targets. 18 The two major findings we take from the empirical analysis are 1) "good" management practices most strongly predict energy savings within industries that require significant energy in their production process and 2) the targets component of the management score appears to be associated with high energy usage, after controlling for other management practices. Both of these findings warrant further discussion as to their place in literature as well as their overall credibility.
Past research on UK plants has shown a clear relationship between the overall management score and energy efficiency and has made no direct attempt to determine which industries were driving the observed efficiency gains associated with good management practices. As shown in Table 4 , we demonstrate that in the U.S. the spillover to energy savings from management occur predominantly in the more energy intensive industries. This result has two important implications. First, that these savings occur in high energy industries implies a far greater overall drop in energy quantity consumed than had previously been estimated. Had the relative energy efficiency gains only occurred in low energy industries, then the overall quantity of energy use reduction would be significantly less. 19 The second implication is that the driving mechanism through which management reduces energy consumption is likely to be through increased profits rather than a correlation with altruism. Firms whose production process requires little energy costs, stand to gain relatively little from a one percent decrease in their energy consumption. However, for firms in energy intensive industries, a one percent decrease will have a sizable impact on their profit level. If a correlation with altruism were driving the result, we would expect to see improvements in energy efficiency for firms in all industries, and not only those for whom energy expenditure has a large impact on their profits. This is also consistent with the notion that energy is more likely to be on the "management radar" when it is a higher share of costs, hence more spillover from general management practices to energy.
The other major finding of this paper is that high scores on the Targets component of management practices, conditional on the other management components, appears to cause firms to be inefficient in their use of energy. While initially surprising, we believe that this result has support from the economics and management literature on goal and target setting as well as anecdotal support from industry insiders. To begin with, it is useful to revisit the specific targets questions which were asked of the plant managers. Of the 18 management practices, five of them were part of the targets component. These five sought to measure the type of targets, whether the targets were interconnected, the time horizon of the targets, whether or not the goals were stretching, and the clarity of the goals. There is no language in the questions that refer specifically to energy targets and according to the guide provided to the interviewers, high scores were to be given for well-developed financial and production targets that pushed plants and their managers to achieve a high level of output by a certain deadline. Firms were also given high scores if these goals were clear and all employees were actively striving to meet them.
The implications of goal setting and targets in the form of agency contract have been examined in depth within both the personnel economics and management literature (see Prendergrast (1999) for a review). Among the key findings is that setting specific targets on certain outcomes, particularly if tied to compensation can frequently lead to other often important outcomes being ignored. This includes the possibility that agents (e.g. plant managers) will respond to the target objective in such a way that is actually harmful to the firm. If firms set strict production targets and there is significant pressure on plants to meet them, then other outcomes, such as the efficient use of energy may be ignored. For example, plants operating under real time electricity pricing may be forced to ramp up production when electricity prices are high and delay maintenance / upgrades of energy using capital in order to meet production quotas.
Not only does the economics literature provide a plausible explanation for the result on targets, but there is also substantial anecdotal evidence from plant managers suggesting energy efficiency is frequently ignored when production targets are pressing. Since the questionnaire never mentions energy and it is possible that the business targets being used cause the plant to use more energy. For example, concerns over product quality delayed the implementation of 20 some very simple energy efficiency activities in auto assembly paint booths at Toyota for as many as 5 years. After addressing this long list of concerns, the efficiency measures were finally implemented. No quality issues emerged and the changes resulted in substantial energy savings 20 . If "production is king" and targets do not include energy but are primarily to meet production, sales, or quality goals, then there may be no "room at the table" for energy efficiency activities, even if these activity are unlikely to impede those goals. This failure to prioritize energy is supported with some anecdotal evidence as described by three corporate energy managers from a range of companies. 21 Thomas Pagliuco, corporate energy manager at Merck, characterizes the prioritization this way:
For most plants, the priorities are: safety, quality, output, compliance, and cost, and cost is probably prioritized as labor, raw material, maintenance/materials, and energy. My experience, even for a large energy user, is that energy is at best a 6th or 7th priority.
Eric Battino, Corporate Energy Manager at Pepsi goes on to say:
Targets are not enough. In fact targets, if they are not tied to fiscal accountability, are generally meaningless to operations.
However, the importance of employee engagement and operations, relative to targets is also born out anecdotally. Thomas Pagliuco, corporate energy manager at Merck, put it this way.
People and operations will help drive energy efficiency as this forms the base for a more efficient overall operation and achievement of the targets. People and processes are the base; targets change. Good people and processes will allow the company to meet their targets, it doesn't work the other way.
Sharon Nolen Eastman Chemical
I think you can more easily make progress with good people and good operations and less easily with a target alone.
In addition, as discussed in (Worrell 2011) ten Canadian potash operations published the details of their benchmarking exercise (CFI 2003) which showed that increased employee awareness and training was the most frequently identified opportunity for improved energy performance.
III. Conclusion
The results found in this paper enhance the understanding of the relationship between energy efficiency and management in a variety of ways. First, we find that for firms in the United States, this relationship is more nuanced than has been shown for firms in the UK. While most "good" management practices have beneficial spillovers on energy efficiency, an emphasis on targets, particularly if they are non-energy targets, is correlated with energy inefficiency.
Additionally, using a more precise measure of energy efficiency we show that the energy gains associated with good management occur primarily in energy intensive industries. Therefore the overall energy gains associated with good management are larger than previous estimates which assumed the savings occurred for the average industry.
Further research is warranted to more closely examine the relationships at hand in this paper and the implications of the energy management gap. Panel data and randomized experiments would present a more causal interpretation. More work should also be done to determine the types of targets employed by a firm and the spillovers these targets can have on a variety outcomes especially for outcomes like energy efficiency which create negative externalities. 
